The Incompleteness of the Economy and Business: A Forceful Reminder by Paul H. Dembinski
The Incompleteness of the Economy and Business: A Forceful
Reminder
Paul H. Dembinski
Published online: 20 January 2012
 The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Many different but related arguments developed
in the Caritas in Veritate converge on one central, yet not
clearly stated, conclusion or thesis: economic and business
activities are ‘incomplete’. This article will explore the
above-mentioned ‘incompleteness’ thesis or argument from
three different perspectives: the role, the practice and the
purpose of economic and business activities in contemporary
societies. In doing so, the paper will heavily draw on ques-
tions and, still not fully learned, lessons derived from the
present financial and economic crisis. Caritas in Veritate
provides an appealing moral framework in which many of
these lessons take a deeper sense and a more comprehensive
meaning. The notion of ‘incompleteness’ is applied here to
economic and business theory and practice in the sense
derived from Go¨del’s theorems. They state in terms of log-
ical and mathematical demonstrations that no system of
axiomatic statements can provide a proof of its own con-
sistency. Such a proof requires the use of statements
belonging to another (higher) level system. In the case of
economics or business theory and practice these ‘higher
level’ statements are value judgments. By stressing the
importance of ethics and moral philosophy for daily life,
Caritas in Veritate strongly reminds us that neither economy
nor business are self-sufficient either in organisational and
social, practical or moral terms.
Keywords Caritas in Veritate  Ethics  Exchange 
Financial crisis  Go¨del’s Theorems  Incompleteness in
economics  Purpose of business  Relation  System of
National Accounts (SNA)  Transaction
According to the too often-quoted phrase attributed to
Milton Friedman, the ‘purpose of business is business.’1
However, by saying this, Friedman and his disciples sup-
pose a shared understanding of what ‘business’ means in
the two senses used in the aphorism: business as practice
and business as purpose. If at one point there was an
agreement in these questions, this is no longer the case as
the present crisis has shaken many certitudes that went
unquestioned for decades. In consequence, in this context
the Friedmanite saying could well be nothing more than an
elegant but void or even fallacious statement, or even a
sophism.2
The ongoing financial and economic crisis proves to be a
very peculiar moment: unexpected, fearful, potentially
lethal to our way of life, but paradoxically, until recently at
least, it did not shake the way financial and economic
activities are conducted or regulated. When the financial
order was shaken to its roots, a number of wrongdoings
were publicly confessed and promises were made both by
private and public actors as to their future conduct.
Looking back to the first pages of major daily newspapers
during these months of fear, one has the impression that
modern capitalism, tantalized by the crude colours in
which the lightning of the crisis has put its functioning and
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1 ‘Widely attributed to Friedman, and sometimes cited as being in his
work Capitalism and Freedom (1962) this is also attributed to Alfred
P. Sloan, with citation of a statement of 1964, but sometimes with
attestations to his use of it as a motto as early as 1923.’ Available at
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Milton_Friedman. Accessed 16 Sept
2011. See, among others, Davis (2005).
2 Khurana and Gintis (2008).
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whereabouts, was examining its own practices without
complacency whilst simultaneously reviewing its founda-
tional values. In these moments of lucidity, practices were
examined against values and judged in moral terms. As the
storm calmed down, the existential fears disappeared.
Consequently, ‘real life’ and self-preserving arguments of
‘business as usual’ resurfaced and regained progressively
all the ground previously lost to idealistic ones. Today,
little trace of these ambitious declarations and commit-
ments is left either in public debate or in private practices.
The gravity of the crisis and the seriousness of the flaws in
dominant practices that appeared so clearly in the lightning
of the storm are being forgotten or even denied, as if it was
just a collective nightmare.
Caritas in Veritate (CV) was published in summer 2009, a
few days before the Aquilla (Italy) G20 meeting. Speaking
up when crisis fears were driving the level of systemic self-
insurance to its lowest level, gave the Pope a larger than usual
audience and drew a lot of attention to the document. The
encyclical did not address technical issues related to the
financial crisis, but to the surprise of many, it put the crisis in
a larger perspective by proposing a theological and escha-
tological reading of it. By doing so Caritas in Veritate—in
line with the tradition of the social teaching of the Church—
was leaving to the addressees, people of good will, the task of
choosing the most appropriate ways to bring their personal
and social daily deeds and practices in harmony with the
theological and eschatological requirements.
Whilst only seldom mentioned explicitly in the docu-
ment, economic and business life is at the centre of papal
concerns. Indeed, many different but related arguments
developed in the encyclical converge on one central, yet
not clearly stated, conclusion: contemporary economic and
business practice and the related dominant theories are
‘incomplete’ at least from the Christian perspective. Con-
sequently, they should neither be seen as autonomous nor
self-sufficient. They need to be framed and supported on
one side by the cultural and political concern for the
common good and on the other by personal concern for
fraternity, ethics and morality.
This article will explore the above-mentioned ‘incom-
pleteness’ argument from three different perspectives: the
role, the practice and the purpose of economic and business
activities in contemporary societies. In doing so, it will draw
heavily from questions and (still not fully learned) lessons
derived from the present financial and economic crisis.
Caritas in Veritate provides an appealing moral framework
in which many of these lessons take a deeper sense and a
more comprehensive meaning.
The notion of ‘incompleteness’ is used here in the sense
derived from Go¨del’s well-known second theorem. This
seminal theorem demonstrates in formal logical terms that a
system of axioms can be proved as logically consistent only
if it is incomplete. In other words, a proof of consistency of an
axiomatic system requires the use of statements external to
the system itself. When applied to economic and business
practice or theory, the Go¨del’s theorem reminds us that those
systems which pretend to provide an internal self-justifica-
tion cannot but fail to do so and are, in fact, simply recursive.
A final justification can only be derived from higher order
statements that are external to the economic and business
realm, namely moral philosophy or even theology.3 Keeping
in mind Go¨del’s seminal contribution, the paper uses it to
explore the logical underpinnings of the ways economic
activity is justified, measured, assessed and practiced in the
contemporary world.
The Role of the Economy and Business in Society
According to the well-known statement by Lionel Robbins,
economics as knowledge, and, more broadly, economic
activity, is about increasing the level of efficiency in the
use of scarce resources to satisfy the unlimited needs of
humanity.4 The achievement of the permanent increase in
efficiency is guaranteed by the combination of two insti-
tutions with one rule of behaviour, namely the enterprise,
the market and the so-called ‘profit motive’ or economic
rationality.
In theory, when the system of perfectly interconnected
markets is ‘complete’ (that is, when a market for every
possible good or service exists), the inventiveness of busi-
ness people eager to pocket profits drives society to the
highest possible level of efficiency, but at the same time
perfect competition prevents profits from growing beyond a
median level achieved in all activities. This self-correcting
mechanism keeps the idealized economy on the efficiency
path. However, the abyss between theory and reality should
not be neglected. In the real world markets are not complete,
competition is not perfect and profits are far from negligible.
Consequently, extreme caution should prevail in extrapo-
lating to the real world any theory-based conclusion. Indeed,
the temptation is enormous to take the promises of theory at
their face value and transpose to the real world conclusions
stemming from the idealized world of models.
Only if markets are complete in the above-mentioned
sense, is limited profit an indication of efficiency in the use
of resources. Indeed, the complete market hypothesis
means that the market mechanism runs all dimensions,
spheres, and issues of social life, leaving nothing outside of
its scope and reach. Only under this extremely restrictive
3 Go¨del (1931), see also Weisstein (2011).
4 Robbins (1932). ‘Economics is the science which studies human
behaviour as a relationship between given ends and scarce means
which have alternative uses’ (p. 16).
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hypothesis can the economic calculation be said to take
into account all the costs and benefits (which are by defi-
nition expressed in monetary terms) without leaving any-
thing of importance outside. In all other cases, one cannot
exclude that in real world the economic activity generates,
outside of the accounting perimeter, costs—and possibly
benefits—usually called externalities, which are not taken
into account in the calculation. In consequence, as long as
the system of markets is incomplete, the result of any
calculation in terms of monetary costs and benefits is
undermined by the existence of externalities—which by
definition have no price and no value tag. Thus, as long as
the completeness hypothesis is not satisfied, every
accounting profit or loss takes into account only costs and
benefits which relate to the part of social life that is gov-
erned by market mechanism. Consequently, the pretension
of economic calculus to lead society to enhanced efficiency
has to be taken with great caution.
The financial crisis drew the public’s attention to the
enormous amounts of profits generated by banks and other
financial institutions. In 2007, the US financial institutions
were generating about 40% of corporate profits whilst con-
tributing only 15% to the US GDP.5 If limited profits,
according to the model, would indicate that efficiency is at its
highest, extravagant profits say just the opposite. Other
indications point in the same direction as they suggest that
the level of strategic and financial interdependence in the
global economy is growing and the level of competition
remains low. Accordingly, the world economy could well be
far from its optimal level of efficiency advocated by theory.6
Persistence of imperfect competition and of incomplete
markets can lead to two opposite lines of action. According
to the first—free market view—one should aim at
extending the scope of markets to every dimension of
social life, whilst for the other, meta-economic and polit-
ical forces should limit the role of markets only to certain
domains of social life. In the first case, as promised by
theory, economic logic aspires to be the dominant principle
governing society, and efficiency will remain its ultimate
goal. In the latter case, market mechanism and economic
logic are bound to be only one amongst other allocating
mechanisms at work in society.
The discussion about the adequate extension and role of
markets is not new. The question has also been, directly or
indirectly, addressed in previous social encyclicals from
Rerum Novarum to Centesimus Annus and also by many
social thinkers and economists interested in Christian social
thought or doctrine.7 Caritas in Veritate clearly states the
incompleteness of purely economic mechanisms by saying
that ‘‘…the conviction that the economy must be autono-
mous, that it must be shielded from ‘influences’ of a moral
character, has led man to abuse the economic process in a
thoroughly destructive way. In the long term, these convic-
tions have led to economic, social and political systems that
trample upon personal and social freedom, and are therefore
unable to deliver the justice that they promise’’ (CV 34). The
Pope goes on to say that ‘[e]conomic activity cannot solve all
social problems through the simple application of commer-
cial logic. This needs to be directed towards the pursuit of the
common good, for which the political community in par-
ticular must also take responsibility’ (CV 36).
Sceptical about the capacity of market logic to run the
whole of society, the encyclical acknowledges the impor-
tance of markets, provided the mechanism is not left alone.
‘The Church has always held that economic action is not to
be regarded as something opposed to society. … Society
does not have to protect itself from the market… (…) the
market is the economic institution that permits encounter
between persons’ (CV 34). But later on, the encyclical
qualifies as follows this statement: ‘Without internal forms
of solidarity and mutual trust, the market cannot com-
pletely fulfil its proper economic function’ (CV 36).
The Doubtful Relevance of SNA-Related Indicators
Many interpretations and discussions took place to capture
the precise meaning of the acknowledgment by the encyc-
lical of the doctrinal incompleteness of the economic and
business logic. This does not require further elaboration here.
However, this doctrinal position—not new in Vatican doc-
uments—has important technical implications for the
importance given to different measurements of economic
activities in the overall assessment of the achievements of
societies. This is especially the case with the set of concepts
and measures rooted in the more than half a century old
methodological framework of the System of National
Accounts (SNA). Aggregates such as GNP and GDP, and the
growth rates derived therefrom, are the most classical, best
known and widely used set of economic measures and suc-
cess indicators. Yet these tools carry with them a set of built-
in assumptions and methodological limitations that are worth
spelling out here when discussing the ‘incompleteness the-
sis’ of economics and business logic.
The relevance of SNA-related indicators for assessing
the overall performance of societies has been criticized
from five main angles, closely related to its ‘incomplete-
ness’: the human development perspective, the happiness
gap, the grey-economy, the ecological perspective and the
uneven value perspective.
5 The Economist, 19 March 2008. Available at http://www.economist.
com/node/10881318. Accessed 16 Sept 2011.
6 Dembinski and Fryzel (2010).
7 Novak (1991), p. 112, Zieba (2000), Laurent (2007).
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In early 1990s, economists working with United Nations
Development Programme started to devise ways to shift the
development agenda away from SNA accounts to a more
people-centred approach. In this framework, a Human
Development Index (HDI) has been established. It com-
bines GNP per capita with other indicators, such as access
of children to education and life expectancy. Despite the
fact that HDI levels present a rather high correlation with
levels of GNP per capita, HDI has achieved its own
legitimacy over the 20 years of its existence.8
The second line of critique of SNA is related to its
empirically demonstrated inability to provide even an
approximate indication of the level of happiness or well
being of societies concerned.9
The third line of critique is summed up very clearly in
the recent report authored by A. Sen and J. Stiglitz on flaws
and limitations in the prevailing SNA.10 The issues raised
by the group of eminent authors refer to limitations that
prevent the SNA from covering all the fields it should.
Consequently, the experts’ effort aims at granting the
possible maximal extension of the SNA framework so as to
make it capture as much of social life as technically pos-
sible. Beyond technicalities, the authors do not see any
other fundamental reason why the SNA coverage should
not be complete and thus far extended beyond the scope
presently governed by market mechanism.
The three mainly technical limitations of SNA on which
the report focuses have been conceptually identified for a
long time but are still present: (a) for administrative rea-
sons, the SNA is unable to capture adequately all the
ongoing economic activity such as grey or black economy,
(b) the SNA does not encompass—mostly for technical
reasons—quasi-economic activities performed outside of
the market, such as household work and (c) the SNA does
not properly capture all the costs related to the economic
activity, especially the damage made to the environment
which is, in accounting terms, a free good. On the basis of
such a diagnosis, which in essence is far from new, most of
the ongoing intellectual and technical efforts aim to make
the SNA ever more all encompassing or more complete.
The fourth line of critique touches on the fundamental
problem of how to know whether the accounting notion of
‘value added’ that stands at the centre of the SNA meth-
odological framework also has a normative meaning, as the
use of the word ‘value’ might suggest. In other terms, the
question would be: ‘Is any accounting value added positive
or good?’ In a strictly economic view, every sound activity
from the business perspective is ‘adding value’ in the SNA
sense. However, some of these activities may seem less
valuable than others. An often-quoted example is a car
repair after an accident. It adds value in the SNA sense, but
usually results in a loss of the car’s value for the owner.
Gasoline spent in traffic jams by no means has either a
positive effect on the economy, on the ecology or on
society but, in accounting terms, it contributes to the
increase of SNA based aggregates.
The point which this critique makes forcefully is to
stress the fact that the accounting framework is unable by
construction to distinguish between ‘useful’ value added,
‘neutral’ value added and ‘not useful’ or even deceptive
value added.11 By taking the SNA figures at their face
value, without any screening, one takes for granted that
every accounting value added effectively adds value to
society. In doing so, one implicitly, and erroneously, sup-
ports the claim of SNA framework to be ‘complete’ and
more broadly to the view that the corresponding figures
give a true and complete image of societal valuations and
realities. In its ultimate conclusion, this argument con-
verges with the one derived from the ‘happiness paradox’
discussed earlier.
Protagonists of debates around the financial crisis have,
sometimes forcefully, asked what is the meaning or
counterpart of the accounting value added (between 5 and
15% of GDP in OECD countries) by the financial sector?12
Every time an attempt is made to distinguish between
‘valuable’ and ‘not so valuable’ value added, the use of a
value judgment is required. Such a judgment has, by def-
inition, to come from the outside of the SNA framework.
This fact further underlines its incompleteness. At its
inception, in late 1930s, the SNA framework was not
designed to be complete, its limits and limitations were
widely recognized. Since then however, the SNA successes
have been breeding the ‘completeness’ ambition, which is
still prevalent today.
Finally, the fifth critique of the SNA-derived figures is
probably the least researched for the time being but
potentially the most devastating. The point to be made here
is the following: as long as the SNA will not provide a
‘complete’ cover of all social and economic activities, its
figures will remain not only incomplete, but also mis-
leading, ideologically loaded and thus, simply wrong. An
example will help to capture the argument: a meal taken by
a group of five at home contributes to the GNP/GDP only
for the amount of cost of its ingredients. The same meal
taken at a restaurant would have a much greater contribu-
tion to GNP/GDP. Consequently, switching from home-
based meals to restaurant meals will translate as economic
growth both in terms of GDP and in terms of jobs. But is it
really growth with its positive connotation? Or is it only
8 ul Haq (1995) and UNDP (2011).
9 Frey and Stutzer (2002) and studies by Layard (2003).
10 Presidency of the French Republic (2009).
11 For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Cobb et al. (1995).
12 Krippner (2005) and Dembinski (2009).
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expansion of the domain regulated by the business or
market logic at the expense of another domain controlled
by the logic of sharing?13
The example used here is not anecdotal. It explains one
of the less studied aspects of the expansion of service
activities. The growth of services in terms of jobs and value
added, and the corresponding structural transformation,
was the main engine of the economic growth that took
place in OECD countries during the last decades.14 The
argument presented here suggests that SNA figures are
largely misleading. What they present as ex nihilo creation
of value added, is—to a large extent—just a transfer of
activities from non-market logic to the market logic. And
here, an implicit value judgement carried along with the
SNA framework comes into play as this transfer has been
called ‘growth’ with its highly positive connotation. In
other words, the hypothesis of a ‘growth fallacy’ has to be
carefully investigated both from the quantitative and con-
ceptual perspective.
Today, the dominant trend wants the SNA framework to
be as complete as possible but, despite all the efforts, this
goal has not yet been achieved. Most of the present SNA
limitations would disappear if all social activity was con-
ducted according to the market and business logic, and if
humans were perfect homines oeconomici. But this is for-
tunately not the case. The critiques and limitations dis-
cussed here acknowledge in fact a double ‘incompleteness’
of SNA: on one side in terms of coverage, on the other in
terms of incapacity to provide grounds for the ultimate
value judgment. The discussion above allows us to derive
three sets of not totally compatible positions in the debate.
For the fatalists, the still prevalent hegemony of GDP/GNP
figures has to be challenged by the use of other synthetic
measures and indicators so as to provide an adequate
assessment of social well-being. For the optimists, the SNA
framework should be continuously expanded to make its
measures and outputs more meaningful every day. And
finally, for the realists, the scope, meaning and ambitions
of the SNA should be explicitly contained so as to capture
only the effective and valuable growth, i.e. all situations
when only ex nihilo value creation takes place. This would
leave aside ‘apparent’ growth (growth or activities derived
from transfer of activities from one logic to another) out-
side of the SNA’s scope and mandate.
This lengthy discussion of the SNA pretension to com-
pleteness has made more apparent the agenda hidden
beyond accounting technicalities. In fact, this framework
provides an implicit and partial intellectual justification for
the continuous expansion of the role business and eco-
nomic activities in contemporary societies. The arguments
in favour of greater ‘completeness’ have proved in recent
decades to be politically very seductive in most OECD
countries despite sharp altermondialist critiques against the
looming ‘marchandisation’ of the world. Caritas in Veri-
tate insists that despite its seductive capacity, neither the
‘completeness thesis’ of economic life nor the claim of
economic logic to be self-sufficient can be accepted on
anthropological as well as on purely theological grounds.
Whilst acknowledging the power and efficiency of the
economic logic, the encyclical stresses also that they have
to be oriented and guided from outside. ‘This requires
further and deeper reflection on the meaning of the econ-
omy and its goals, as well as a profound and far-sighted
revision of the current model of development, so as to
correct its dysfunctions and deviations’ (CV 32). ‘Devel-
opment must include not just material growth but also
spiritual growth’ (CV 69). Or ‘(y)et it must be acknowl-
edged that this same economic growth has been and con-
tinues to be weighed down by malfunctions and dramatic
problems’ (CV 21).
The Practice of Business: From Efficiency to Fecundity
After having shown how far reaching the implications of
the incompleteness thesis are for the role that economic
activities ought to play in society, the time has come to
address its implications for the practice of business. The
way business and economic activities are conducted stands
at the centre of the Pope’s concern. Indeed, the most
striking paragraphs in Caritas in Veritate, deal with gra-
tuitousness, and are of direct relevance to the actual prac-
tice of business.
‘There is no free lunch’—this often repeated statement
summarises the core principle of much of contemporary
business thinking and practice. It is also the main principle of
every ‘serious’ economics or management textbook. It
means that there is no place left, and there should be no place
left, for free gift and gratuity either in the business practice, in
economic activity and even in economic thought.
Both economic practice and theory are based on the
same premise: nothing is free; everything has to be paid or
compensated for by an equivalent. From a business per-
spective a truly ‘free lunch’, with no expected future
counter parties or advantages, means forgone income,
whilst in macroeconomic terms, it means loss of efficiency.
From this follows an important recommendation: if pockets
of gifts and gratuity still exist, they should be eradicated in
the name of increased income and macroeconomic gains in
efficiency. As a consequence, gratuity is either business
13 Pigou (1932) in his seminal work ‘Economics of Welfare’
identified the following paradox as a serious but not a destructive
shortcoming of the notion of ‘national dividend’: ‘…if a man marries
his housekeeper or his cook, the national dividend is diminished’.
14 Maroto Sanchez (2010).
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opportunity or waste and for both the reasons it should be
substituted with a commercial transaction. By eradicating
gratuity, humanity is supposed to head towards greater
efficiency and closer to the ideal of ‘complete markets’
referred to in the previous paragraph.
In such a context, economic efficiency would be at its
peak as the individual—perfectly selfish and, therefore,
perfectly isolated—communicates with the rest of the
world exclusively by means of prices and quantities. Thus,
the intellectual building up of a society, not to say of a
market civilisation, rests on a strong anthropological vision
known by the name homo oeconomicus. In a world of homo
oeconomicus, a free lunch is an absurdity. The anthropo-
logical cornerstone of contemporary economicist ideology
has been laid down by Vilfredo Pareto in Lausanne, on the
shores of Lake Geneva, where he lived at the beginning of
the twentieth century. However, under Pareto’s pen, homo
oeconomicus was only an exercise in style. Over the last
20 years or so, the fundamentally selfish rationality of
homo oeconomicus, totally devoid of any ethical concern,
has become not only a general reference used in economic
modelling but also the anthropological underlying present
in business teaching and practice, especially in market-
ing.15 Although largely dominant, this paradigm is not
totally hegemonic amongst economists. Some authors, such
as Herbert Simon and Stefano Zamagni, to mention only
two names out of a much longer list, argue that not only
egoism but also altruism is compatible with economic
thinking and theorizing.16
The practical relevance of this intellectual construct of
economics as theory has been seriously brought into
question by the current crisis. A world of complete mar-
kets, together with homo oeconomicus, suffices to establish
an entirely and exclusively economic ideal of civilisation.
In such a world, the clash of selfish individuals, put into
competition by the market, is sufficient to solve all prob-
lems and all conflicts through exchange transactions (see
below). Such a state of affairs corresponds to the ideal of
what may be called ‘economic fundamentalism’ which
could—if it has not happened already—degenerate into an
ideology.
Caritas in Veritate refutes point by point both the
economistic ideology and the resulting business practice.
‘There ought to be (some) free lunches,’ the Pope seems to
say. This is so because human nature blossoms and reaches
its fulfilment in generosity and in generous relations with
others. The Catholic Church offers a reading of human
nature diametrically opposite to that of homo oeconomicus.
Charity (Caritas) can not have another foundation or jus-
tification than that of the truth (Veritas) of the human
nature. The encyclical clearly spells out the link between
the two, ‘(t)ruth opens and unites our minds in the lo´gos of
love’ (CV 4). Nowadays, business practice and economic
thought tend rather to pose as centres of social and indi-
vidual life. Taking the opposite view, Benedict XVI (2009)
emphasises their incompleteness. Business and financial
transactions are, at best, means, whilst what is truly at stake
concerns the ends. Economic and business activities are
there to serve human destiny rather than preside over it.
The encyclical states that ‘if the market is governed solely
by the principle of the equivalence in value of exchanged
goods, it cannot produce the social cohesion that it requires
in order to function well. Without internal forms of soli-
darity and mutual trust, the market cannot completely fulfil
its proper economic function’ (CV 35).
Although the encyclical recognises explicitly the
importance of the equivalent exchanges, of contracts, of
profit and of the institutions that are governing them, i.e.
the market and the enterprise, it calls to see them as means
and to discover their proper meaning in the light of proper
goals. These means are necessary, but not sufficient to
allow each human being and all people to fulfil their
vocation of integral development. It is not a question of
legislating or of acting through macropolitical regulations,
which hardly succeed, as it is in guaranteeing a minimum
of justice, but of reconfiguring in depth the practice and
behaviour of economic agents. ‘The importance of this goal
is such as to demand our openness to understand it in depth
and to mobilize ourselves at the level of the ‘heart’, so as to
ensure that current economic and social processes evolve
towards fully human outcomes’ (CV 20).
At the heart of the papal diagnosis lays the non- or ill-
development of contemporary humanity, a situation that
does not come down to the material dimension only and
that is not confined to the so-called developing countries.
The current crisis, then, is ‘an opportunity for discernment,
in which to shape a new vision for the future.’ The
encyclical insists on a necessary double renewal to come
out of the crisis. It is necessary to start at the intellectual
level where the need for a ‘new humanist synthesis’ is
striking, and follow with practical action, where new
business models, practices and structures are to be exper-
imented with and put into action.
This double renewal demands that human truth should
never be lost from sight in such abstractions as structure,
technique, progress and growth. Profit and market can
never overwhelm human beings in their individuality and
their uniqueness. How are we to articulate the generous
aspiration to this ‘new humanism’ in day-to-day action? In
15 Demeulenaere (1996) and Dembinski (2005).
16 When discussing the current use made of utility theory, Herbert
Simon reminds us that it is compatible with an altruistic anthropology
but also acknowledges that its use has been distorted: ‘that economic
actors desire only economic gain is a far stronger assumption that they
maximize utility. It is also empirically false’ (p. 158). Simon (1993);
on this topic, see also Zamagni (1995).
34 P. H. Dembinski
123
the encyclical there are no recipes or magic wands, there
are no technical and impersonal ‘‘it’s just a question of ‘one
should’ or ‘one must’’’. The only practicable path sug-
gested by Benedict XVI is that we are all to act or, more
realistically, that each person starts acting without waiting
for the others. By doing what? And here comes the revo-
lutionary recommendations: by putting some giving and
generosity into the heart of business practice (not aside of
it), which means by going beyond the strict (and in fact
sterile) equivalent exchange to write a surplus into it, a
dimension of giving. The encyclical says indeed that ‘(t)he
great challenge before us, accentuated by the problems of
development in this global era and made even more urgent
by the economic and financial crisis, is to demonstrate, in
thinking and behaviour… that in commercial relationships
the principle of gratuitousness and the logic of gift as an
expression of fraternity can and must find their place within
normal economic activity’ (CV 36). These words are an
invitation to business practitioners to acknowledge and by-
pass the highly seductive but erroneous vision of equiva-
lence and of completeness at the heart of the currently
prevailing ‘no free lunch’ paradigm. This is a call to part
ways with the corresponding economistic ideology.
The current prevalence of the equivalent transactions in
the business world derives from their key technical features
that make them easy to manage. The first characteristic of
transactions is their impersonality. In transactions, what
matters are the goods exchanged, not the persons or actors
who exchange them. Consequently, the identity of actors
does not and should not have any impact on the price paid
or on the quality of the purchased unit of good. Each unit is
supposed by the theory to be strictly identical to all the
others. This may be true in depersonalised industrial pro-
duction, but is more difficult to be achieved in services.
That is the reason why sophisticated marketing tries to
‘personalize’ the transaction. This is, however, only a mere
instrumental customisation dictated by yield-management
techniques, rather than true personalisation that would
require taking into account the genuine person of the other.
A second important characteristic of transactions is their
instantaneity. A transaction is equilibrated at the moment it
takes place, there is no future to it, and there is no past,
only the instant when the equivalence has been established
by agreement of parties. A transaction is instantaneous and
therefore static by design.
A third characteristic is the completeness or equivalence
of transactions in line with the ‘no free lunch’ principle.
Every dimension of the exchanged goods or services is
taken account of in the price formation; nothing is left for
free or unpaid for.
A fourth characteristic is the fact that an impersonal
transaction will only take place in an environment in which
the necessary level of trust has been provided by means
external to the transaction itself. Auditors, solicitors, law-
yers, experts, insurers, brokers, etc. embody the rule of law,
which in the last analysis provides trust necessary to allow
impersonal actors to exchange and trade on more or less
organized markets.
Finally, the fifth and last characteristic of transaction is
its instrumental nature. Impersonal buying or selling is a
mean used by each of the parties to achieve a goal that lies,
by definition, outside of the transaction itself. The trans-
action will provide cash to the seller that she will be able to
use when buying goods and services, whilst the buyer will
use the purchased goods to satisfy a more or less urgent
need. Consequently, parties aspire only to an efficient
closing of the transaction.
Due to these characteristics, transactions may appear as
self-contained and independent units easy to quantify, to
assemble, sort or categorise. As such they are easy to
manage by impersonal and highly technical procedures
used in corporations and taught in modern business
schools.17 On a macroeconomic level, the world made of
transactions appears in the categories of economic analysis
as efficient. All this being said, Caritas in Veritate is much
less enthusiastic about the prevalence of transactions than
economist view and business practice would expect. The
main reason for this discomfort is the moral incomplete-
ness of transactions, which are unable to provide ‘heart’ to
efficiency. They are unable by themselves to turn efficiency
into fraternity, as they are unable to turn growth into
integral development. The main reason for this is the
inability of transactions to acknowledge the uniqueness of
the other, to see the counter party to the transaction as a
person. The encyclical says, ‘[e]conomic, social and
political development, if it is to be authentically human,
needs to make room for the principle of gratuitousness as
an expression of fraternity’ (CV 34). Previously, the fol-
lowing distinction between neighbours and brothers has
been made: ‘As society becomes ever more globalised, it
makes us neighbours but does not make us brothers. Rea-
son, by itself, is capable of grasping the equality between
men and of giving stability to their civic coexistence, but it
cannot establish fraternity’ (CV 19).
It has been argued at length that the rapid growth of the
number of financial transactions during the last quarter of
century was one of the causes of the crisis. It has also been
argued that for a long time a shift was taking place in
banking business models from relation-based business
models to transactions based-ones.18 Today the quantita-
tive supremacy of transactions over relations is very clear
in the financial arena. But in fact it also affected other
industries and most of received business practices. During
17 Mintzberg (2004).
18 Dembinski (2009) and Meeerschwam (1987).
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the last quarter of the twentieth century western societies
moved a long way from To¨nnies’s Gemeinschaft to
Gesellschaft. In this process, the fecundity of relations as a
mode of interaction has been sacrificed to the promises of
efficiency carried by a transaction-based society.
As the encyclical invites people of good will to redis-
cover the ‘category of relation’, it provides a unique
opportunity to oppose the two notions, transaction and
relation, and contrast their features along the lines proposed
above. If a transaction is anonymous and impersonal, quite
the opposite is true for relations. Only when parties know
each other in their peculiarities, might they enter a rela-
tionship. This is, for instance, true in a debt relation which
leaves room for the mutual adaptation and recognition of
peculiarities and singularities of each of the parties. If
transactions are instantaneous, relations have by definition
a duration: some are everlasting, others are short, but all
extend beyond the instant. A relation is, therefore, inscri-
bed in time and as such has a history, and in most cases, a
future. Consequently, relations have a built in dynamic, as
opposed to the instantaneous and static nature of transac-
tions. If transactions are, or at least pretend to be, techni-
cally complete because they are built on equivalence in an
economic sense, relations, by definition, are a succession of
unbalanced moments. Like walking, a relation is a suc-
cession of disequilibria that feed and counter-balance each
other. This non-equivalence characteristic of relations
provides room for gratuitousness and gift that can develop
into reciprocity (which is not identical with equivalence).
For instance, trust is one of the most important gifts that a
party to a relation—any relation including a business one—
can give to the other party. Once introduced into a rela-
tional framework, trust can grow (or disappear) as the seed
of a fruit that will blossom and mature in the next stages of
the relation. Unpredictable as to its future, a relation is
potentially the locus of fecundity whilst transactions do not
leave any room for it. Many business examples show that
joint projects and cooperation often lead to totally unex-
pected fruits.
As said before, transactions require trust to be provided
by the environment in which they take place. Indeed, the
rule of law, the judiciary institutions, accounting rules,
procedures and, in some cases, also raking agencies, are
supposed to provide external trust necessary for smooth,
impersonal and anonymous transactions. In the case of
relations, the situation is different: trust—or distrust—
develops internally. Parties trust each other because they
know their respective individual peculiarities. Conse-
quently, when developed into networks, relations can
contribute to an increased level of trust in society. The
famous saying of London bankers ‘my word is my bond’
does not mean anything outside of a club or network of
mutually trusting gentlemen. This, however, should not
obscure the fact that mafia and other criminal networks are
also built on mutual trust (and sometimes fear).
It has been shown that in transactions the other party is
instrumental. This is only to some extent true in relations
where the other has a face, an identity and a time-span.
Even in a business environment where relations are tools
for conducting operations, seldom are they only instru-
mental. If this is the case, they will fail because of not
having achieved the minimal level of trust required for a
more forceful development. More and more often smaller
enterprises complain about the fact that their larger busi-
ness partners have totally lost the sense of inter-personal
relations and run business on a purely contractual basis.
By contrasting relations with transactions, their potential
clearly appears. Transactions, by their commitment to
instantaneous efficiency, deliver immediately everything
that can be harvested at once. On the opposite side, rela-
tions balance the fruits of past efforts with the seeds for
future results. Looking from a strictly business perspective,
both the transactions and relations are useful and comple-
ment each other to a large extent. The crisis has shown,
however, that the preference for transactions, one aspect of
which is short-termism, has driven our economies into very
dangerous waters. The best example in this context is the
so-called ‘originate and distribute’ strategy of financial
institutions active in the sub-prime.19 This strategy attrac-
ted much attention after the crisis and may have been one
of the triggering factors of the crisis. In this business
model, the mortgage financial relationship was initiated
only with the purpose to be sold on to another financial
institution. In this example, the relation was instrumental-
ized for the needs of a subsequent transaction.20
The call of Caritas in Veritate to redesign business
practice comes at a time when the business community is
rediscovering the need for trusting relationships but for less
theological reasons. The reason lies in security and proper
risk management. The convergence of these two concerns
provides a window of opportunity for a profound change in
practice but also in the way future business people are
trained. Thinking and acting more long term could open up
the minds of decision makers to distil some graciousness in
the hard world of business which may lead them to rec-
ognize the face of the other—using Levinas’s images—
behind the cells of their Excel spreadsheets.
19 Bank of International Settlements started warning about the
dangers of this strategy as soon as 2006 and 2007—see the
corresponding BIS’s Annual Reports.
20 Frankel (2002).
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The Purpose of Business—Serving the Person
As mentioned above, according to the widely quoted, but
fortunately not always accepted, Friedmanite saying, the
practice of business is business’s only purpose. More pre-
cisely, and in line with today’s dominant ‘shareholder
view’ of the corporation, this means that return on capital
should be the main purpose of business. The incomplete-
ness thesis (or argument) challenges forcefully this extre-
mely narrow view of the purpose of economic and business
activities. The encyclical strongly qualifies the currently
undisputed ‘profit motive’: ‘(p)rofit is useful if it serves as
a means towards an end that provides a sense both of how
to produce it and how to make good use of it. Once profit
becomes the exclusive goal … it risks destroying wealth
and creating poverty’ (CV 21). These words stand in sharp
contrast to the emblematic response of Gordon Gekko, the
hero of the film Wall Street (1987). When asked about how
much he wanted to earn, his answer was simply ‘more’.
Over the past years much has been written about the role
of the ‘greed factor’ in the making of the recent crisis.21
Legal and mechanical checks and balances have been
discussed and devised including limitations on top execu-
tive remunerations and bonuses. G-20 was supposed to
propose a global measure on these issues—but progress has
been more than limited. This being said, such measures did
not address the issue of purpose in its essential meaning.
According to the still prevailing dominant view, inherited
from Mandeville, private vices—thanks to the mysterious
and almost divine work of the invisible hand—are trans-
formed into public virtues.22 The logical strength of this
argument has seduced generations of social philosophers
and business leaders as it makes senseless any discussion
about the ‘true’ purpose of business. On the contrary, the
encyclical, in line with previous papal teaching, even
though it acknowledges the importance of profit as success
indicator, stresses that it needs to be at the service of a
higher purpose.
The main qualification here is that profit as such does
not tell anything either about the conditions in which it has
been generated or used. No moral judgment on profits can
be formulated without clarity on these two points. Unlike
the contemporary ‘new philanthropy’, which underlines the
generosity of those that made fortunes when they distribute
them, for the Christian, the ways in which profit has been
generated is probably even more important than its use.
Indeed, from a management perspective, profit may—in
some cases—result from a lack of commutative justice
in the relations between the enterprise and its main
stakeholders. It may well happen that the enterprise takes
advantage of its market power to enforce prices or wages
that are unjust. This may happen without any violation of
existing positive legislation, but only by violating the
natural duty of justice and prudence.23
This discussion shows that if the purpose of business is
limited to ‘profit’, it is set to remain incomplete. It misses
the ultimate purpose of any human economic activity:
‘Man is the source, the focus and the aim of all economic
and social life’.24 This reminder has far reaching conse-
quences for the business world; man is to be served, not to
be taken advantage of. Thus, the purpose of business is to
help human development, and not to enslave him to ser-
vices and products he does not really need. Neuro-mar-
keting today is well advanced in the use of sub-conscious
selling techniques, brand management and advertising
campaigns that ‘target’ (in the proper sense) segments of
the market often made up of the most vulnerable, as in the
case with the sub-prime mortgages.25 All these techniques
aim at generating profits, at building up the shareholder
value of companies. But do they serve men and women?
The encyclical also reminds us that the ‘subsidiarity
principle’ is above all a moral, and not merely a manage-
ment, principle (CV 57). Although subsidiarity is often
referred to in matters of political, constitutional and social
organisation, its moral underpinnings are seldom discussed
in the context of economic and business activities where it
is seen more as a management tool of decentralisation
aiming at increasing the overall efficiency of the organi-
sation. If taken earnestly and applied to economic life, the
moral dimension of subsidiarity could well suggest that
economic and business activities have to preserve and
respect the autonomy of the clients with regard to goods
and services that may put them into dependence. This
reminds us once again that the conditions in which profit
has been generated are at least as important as the amount
of profit itself.
If businesses were careful at producing only goods and
services that ennoble their clients and help them in their
integral development, then only ‘good value added’ would
be produced in the economy. Consequently, one of the
limitations of the SNA discussed earlier would disappear.
21 Among many books and articles, Augar (2005), Partenoy (2003),
or Anne (2010).
22 Foley (2006).
23 When analysing the current financial crisis, the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements states the following in its Annual Report (2009):
‘…these weaknesses allowed the entire financial industry to book
profits too early, too easily and without proper risk adjustment’ (p. 7).
24 Caritas in Veritate, 27, quoting Second Vatican Ecumenical
Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World
Gaudium et Spes, 63.
25 Twitchell (1998).
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Beyond Incompleteness—Towards a Unique Decision
Framework
Figure 1 below proposes a frame of reference that may be
helpful for checking the meaning and sense of business
decisions or actions. This framework is the cornerstone of
an assessment methodology currently being developed by
the Observatoire de la Finance, called ‘Mind the (ethical)
gap’.26 It suggests that every business or professional
decision has at least four dimensions and that each of these
dimensions stems from a specific paradigm and should be
considered together with the other dimensions before a
final decision is reached. When applied to specific situa-
tions or decisions, this analytical framework could assist in
searching for options and alternatives, as it shows that more
often than not, in real life, tension may occur between the
legal deeds, the profit motive, the care of the intrinsic
quality of action, and the external impact of any decision.
This framework has four dimensions, each of which
contributes to giving a moral compass to any business
decision: (a) in the North: contribution to economic per-
formance, (b) in the East: the intrinsic quality of the action,
the professional ‘doing well’, (c) in the South: the quality
of impact the decision has on third parties, on those that are
not involved in the decision making process and will be
confronted with its consequences, (d) in the West: the
degree of conformity with legal rules and internal proce-
dures of the enterprise.
In a ‘complete’ business world, corresponding to the one
depicted by the dominant economic theory, only the N-W
part of the diagram matters, the other portions are irrele-
vant. On the opposite, in an environment where gratu-
itousness prevails, S-E portion plays a prominent role.
By reminding us that the four dimensions give meaning
simultaneously to any decision, this assessment framework
offers a possibility to escape the golden prison of the
completeness dogma. Indeed, the only way for new
humanism to progress in the business community is to
remind us of the meta-economic meaning of any economic
or business activity.
Conclusions
The crisis has increased the interest for ‘ethics’ in the
business world, at least in some of its circles. In parallel, on
the political level, in the aftermath of the crisis, a broader
call to ‘moralise capitalism’ has been issued by the French
President Nicolas Sarkozy in January 2009.27 Even if these
words remain, for the time being, without clear content,
their use shows that many share the feeling that the ‘profit
motive’ is an incomplete and even dangerously reductive
description of the true purpose of business.
Ethics specialists also seem to be divided on the issue of
purpose. Two main approaches can be distinguished: the
dominant ‘Business Ethics’ view closer to professional
deontology (i.e. obligations agreed within a profession and
related to its role in society) and the ‘Ethics in Business’
which acknowledges that the source of ethics is transcen-
dent to the realm of business and professional life. The two
best-known traditions of ‘Ethics in Business’ are virtue
ethics and the Kantian categorical imperative approach.
For the currently dominant ‘Business Ethics’ view,
deontology seen as a set of accepted professional codes of
conduct will guarantee and preserve the good functioning
of the business community or of the market. This approach
to ethics takes business activity and its logic as a given. For
the ‘Ethics in Business’ approach, business is a field in
which more general ethical principles have to be applied.
This allows for a constant questioning of business logic
itself and requires consequently the identification of the
underlying general ethical questions behind the peculiari-
ties of every business situation or action.28 Only this
approach, which refers to ‘higher level’ statements, is
compatible with the incompleteness view as it refers to
values and virtues that have a universal meaning, not
limited to the business sphere and not derived from it. For
the ‘Ethics in Business’ approach, the ethical obligations
are exogenous and transcendent to the field of business
whilst they are to a large extent endogenous to it for the
‘Business Ethics’ view.29
Intristic quality of action Conformity with rules and procedures
Economic performance 










Fig. 1 Ethics in business: four dimensions that help give sense and
meaning to any business and economic decision
26 Available at www.obsfin.ch. Accessed 16 Sept 2011.
27 ‘La crise du capitalisme financier n’appelle pas a` la destruction du
capitalisme, qui serait une catastrophe, mais a` sa moralisation’ said
President Sarkozy on the 8 Jan 2009. Available at http://www.elysee.
fr/president/les-actualites/discours/2009/colloque-nouveau-monde-
nouveau-capitalisme.6846.html. Accessed 16 Sept 2011.
28 Mele (2009).
29 Ossipow (2010).
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This article has shown that one of the ultimate points the
last encyclical makes is to stress the unbridgeable incom-
pleteness of business and economic activities. Such a
conclusion may be destabilizing to many who might have
thought or even taken for granted, as they follow the still
dominant paradigm in business, that the economic and
business life was morally autonomous. This article has
argued, using Go¨del’s theorem, that the claim for moral
autonomy is logically inconsistent as neither business
practice nor economic activity can provide a self-justifi-
cation without referring to ‘higher level’ statements. This
means that economic activity and business practice, in any
case, rely on a moral judgment either made implicitly or
explicitly. By making the ‘incompleteness’ point clear,
Caritas in Veritate encourages all of us to spell out and
critically assess the content of the implicit ‘higher level’
statements that we use to confront our ‘business as usual’
worldviews. To Catholics, and more broadly to Christians,
the encyclical provides an in-depth moral and theological
discussion of the ‘higher statements’ relevant to their
worldview. In doing so, the encyclical provides a powerful
pedagogical instrument for Christians and contributes
greatly to laying the groundwork for dialogue on these
issues between Christians and non-Christians.
This being said, those who want to take the incom-
pleteness argument seriously and want to act consequently,
will have to change their way of thinking and acting in
their professional life. It will require from all concerned,
business and political decision makers as well as civil
servants and middle management, to permanently question
and assess the meaning of their activities in the perspective
of the ultimate finality of every human deed: the fostering
of the human fraternity.
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